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Shortly after the death of Louis D. Brandeis on October 5, 1941, Max
Lerner forecast: "Years from now, when historians can look back and put
our time into perspective, they will say that one of its towering
figures-more truly great than generals and diplomats, business giants
and labor giants, bigger than most of our presidents-was a man called
Brandeis."' Comments like this one create a legend about a man who, in
his own lifetime, certainly inspired enormous adoration but also generated
a good deal of animosity. Alpheus Thomas Mason's masterful, but largely
uncritical, biography, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life,' published in 1946,
contributed to the Brandeis legend. Over the next twenty-five years noth-
ing was published to change this laudatory portrait in any significant
way. Scholarly interest in Brandeis increased in 1971, with the publica-
tion of the first volume of the Letters of Louis D. Brandeis and A Mind
of One Piece: Brandeis and American Reform,4 by Melvin I. Urofsky,
one of the editors of the Brandeis Letters. And with the completion of the
fifth, and what then was thought to be the final, volume of the Letters in
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1978, 5 a Brandeis industry took off in earnest: Seven books dealing with
Brandeis have been published since 1980, none of which questions the
prevailing view of Brandeis as a "towering figure."
'
What accounts for this public and scholarly fascination with Brandeis?
7
Other contemporaneous figures would appear to have an equal claim on
the mind of the present generation. Justices of similar stature to Bran-
deis-in this century we might name Holmes, Hughes, Stone and Car-
dozo-have served on the Supreme Court and yet have received far less
scholarly attention. Brandeis was not the only prominent lawyer to engage
successfully in the work of reform. Other men and women had an equal
or greater impact on the Zionist movement in America and abroad. From
the perspective of the present generation, does Justice Brandeis deserve all
the acclaim?
Two recent books gave promise of being distinguished entries in the
field of Brandeis scholarship: Leonard Baker's Brandeis and Frank-
furter: A Dual Biography8 and Philippa Strum's Louis D. Brandeis: Jus-
tice for the People.9 Baker, who had won a Pulitzer Prize for Days of
Sorrow and Pain: Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews, had dealt with legal
figures and themes previously in works on John Marshall and FDR's
court-packing fight and could be expected to treat the Brandeis/Frank-
furter material with authority and insight. Strum's solid record of schol-
5. Because of the current availability of two manuscript collections not open to researchers at the
time the original five volumes of Letters were published, two additional volumes are now being pre-
pared. The first will contain letters from Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, and the second will consist of
letters to Brandeis's wife and daughters.
6. In addition to the two reviewed here, these books are: N. DAWSON, Louis D. BRANDEIS,
FEux FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL (1980); A. GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); M.
UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION (1981); B. MURPHY, THE
BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982); L. PAPER, BRANDEIS (1983). While Murphy's book
challenges the Brandeis legend, it does so by making a somewhat sensational attack on Brandeis's
character, rather than by placing Brandeis's legal contribution in crticia perspective. See infra notes
55-57 and accompanying text. Thomas McCraw's Prophets of Regulation, however, does devote two
of its chapters to a critique of Brandeis's economic thought. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying
text.
7. While scholarly interest is certainly encouraged by the availability of certain individuals' pa-
pers, that cannot by itself account for the number of works dealing with those individuals. If it did, we
would expect to find many more books and articles, for example, about President and Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, a contemporary of Brandeis, whose papers at the Library of Congress contain
a wealth of material. In Brandeis's case the existence of major collections of his papers acted as an
incentive to scholarly attention, but his difficult-to-read handwriting hindered the efforts of some.
Thus the publication of Brandeis's letters surely promoted work on the Justice; yet any serious study
of his career would entail examining the original manuscripts held by various institutions because the
Urofsky-Levy edition of Brandeis's Letters is selective. The published Letters, however, with their
excellent annotation, do make the scholar's task easier. In this sense, they undoubtedly have contrib-
uted to the number of recent works on Brandeis.
8. L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY (1984) [hereinafter cited by
author and page number only].
9. P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE (1984) [hereinafter cited by author
and page number only].
Vol. 95: 195, 1985
The Brandeis Spell
arly publication and ten years of research into sources, some of which had
never before been used, led to eager anticipation of the appearance of her
biography. However, while Strum's book fulfills its promise, Baker's work
falls woefully short. Moreover, both books leave us questioning whether
all the recent attention paid to Brandeis adds any fresh insight to our
knowledge of the man and his times or helps us place his achievements
into critical perspective.
One cannot help wondering as one begins Baker's Brandeis and
Frankfurter why he decided to write a "dual biography." No clear expla-
nation is contained in the book, which has neither preface nor introduc-
tion. (In the acknowledgments Baker says merely that someone at Harper
& Row gave him the idea.") Early on, Baker does suggest a possible
reason for the combination:
Brandeis, born in America, the child of immigrants, and Frank-
furter, who came to the United States as an immigrant; their story is
the immigrant story. Brandeis, secure in his American birth, devoted
much of his life to assisting the immigrants, identified with them.
Frankfurter, always mindful of his foreign birth, became their
symbol.11
The immigrant experience is one of a few possible unifying themes that
Baker touches on but fails to develop. Beyond the fact that Brandeis and
Frankfurter were involved in many of the same activities and that their
lifetimes, when combined, spanned more than a century, thus giving the
author an opportunity to cover a large chunk of American history, there
appears to be no advantage-at least in the hands of Mr. Baker-to a
paired biography. In his attempt to deal with so many people and events,
Baker gives most of them short shrift, presenting us with, essentially, a
chatty, chronological narrative with little of substance treated in depth,
and a good number of things presented incorrectly or in a misleading
manner.
The first chapter, which opens dramatically with Brandeis arguing
before the Supreme Court, exemplifies the problems found throughout
Baker's book. Dealing with the famous "Brandeis brief" case of Muller v.
Oregon12 at great length (for this book: fourteen pages), Baker introduces
the scene, the characters, the social issues, and the legal issues-all in
sweeping strokes-trying to capture the essence of each with as few words
as possible. After one paragraph summarizing the legal context of Muller
10. L. BAKER, at 494.
11. Id. at 45.
12. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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(in which no cases are mentioned and no citations given for the substance
of the summary),1 Baker begins to describe Brandeis's oral argument. In
so doing, Baker reveals his lack of understanding of argument before the
Supreme Court generally and Brandeis's Muller argument in particular.
According to Baker's account, Brandeis, in asking the justices to uphold
an Oregon law that limited the workday of women laundry workers to ten
hours, wanted the Court "to change its thinking, jettison its definitions.
14
Not two paragraphs later, however, Baker describes Brandeis's method as
"[s]eizing upon the remarks in earlier opinions, building them into a ra-
tionale, . . . attempting to persuade the Court to funnel those diverse re-
marks into a decision which, in turn, would influence other decisions."
13
Clearly, if Brandeis's strategy was to place the Muller argument within
the context of the Court's existing jurisprudence, he wbuld not suggest
that the Court "change its thinking, jettison its definitions." Indeed, he
did not. Although Brandeis employed a novel approach in Muller, it was
one that allowed the justices to uphold unanimously the Oregon law with-
out upsetting previously declared doctrine.1" But this contradiction seems
to have escaped Baker, who further misunderstands Brandeis's thinking
by imputing opinions to him simply because they represent the opposite of
what Muller's counsel expressed. Baker quotes the summary of the issue
in the case as stated by Muller's attorneys in their brief:
The question involved is far-reaching. If such legislation may be sus-
tained and justified merely because the employee is a woman, and if
such employment in a healthy vocation may be limited and restricted
in her case, there is no limit beyond which the legislative power may
not go.1
7
In contrast, Baker notes, Brandeis hoped that when his argument ended
"all would understand, as his opponents had said, that 'there is no limit
beyond which the legislative power may not go."' Surely Brandeis would
13. L. BAKER, at 3.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id.
16. The Court, using "substantive due process" doctrine, balanced freedom of contract against a
state's inherent power to regulate the health of its citizens. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)
(upholding Utah law restricting working hours of miners as reasonable health regulation); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating working-hour law for bakers as unreasonable).
17. L. BAKER, at 4.
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never have urged such an extreme proposition before the Court, 8 and,
more to the point, Baker cites no authorities in support of his contention. 9
Baker misconceives the oral argument further by describing the pro-
ceedings before the Supreme Court as if they exactly followed the briefs
submitted by Brandeis and the opposing counsel.20 Although one can sym-
pathize with an author's desire to dramatize his material, Baker's presen-
tation is very misleading: Arguments before the Court rarely repeat every-
thing that is in the brief in the order it is treated in that document. In
fact, we have no record of Brandeis's argument in Muller. Even Alpheus
Mason was reduced to assessing Brandeis's performance in Muller by
quoting from a 1944 memorandum that Mason himself had solicited from
Josephine Goldmark, who had worked with Brandeis on the brief.21
Baker undermines the reader's confidence in his method by freely filling
gaps in his information with guesswork. He deals with many of the well-
known episodes in the lives of Brandeis and Frankfurter in a simplistic
manner, authoritatively stating his views on various matters without pro-
viding supporting evidence.22
In particular, Baker's treatment of the financial arrangement between
Brandeis and Frankfurter, and his discussion of Frankfurter's views on
Roosevelt's court-packing plan, illustrate the lack of attention to the need
for proper documentation. In a few pages, Baker attempts to put an end
to the controversy that has been raging ever since Bruce Murphy's The
Brandeis /Frankfurter Connection28 appeared. Murphy argued that the
financial help that Justice Brandeis extended to Professor Frankfurter
"was given . . . not merely out of generosity, but as part of an entire
package that over the years included literally hundreds of requests for
political action by Frankfurter."'2' The funds sent to Frankfurter compen-
18. There are illustrations throughout Brandeis's career that show his antipathy to the idea that
legislatures have no limits. In the judicial context, see, for example, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Brandeis joining opinion of court invalidating federal "fair competition"
legislation on commerce clause grounds) and Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555 (1935) (invalidating provision of federal bankruptcy law on Fifth Amendment due process
grounds).
19. Strum presents a much more sophisticated analysis of Muller, one that sets the case in the
context of some of the Supreme Court's previous liberty of contract cases. See P. STRUM, at 114-23.
20. L. BAKER, at 13-14.
21. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 250, 660 n.12.
22. Baker's method of citation is sloppy. He sometimes quotes from manuscripts without supply-
ing the author or the date in either the text or the endnote. See, for example, the quotation on page 11
that begins "if you look about his home," and the endnote on page 510. In other cases, he has some
unusual authorities for material in the text. Baker gives a short description of the lifestyle of Joseph
Choate, stating "The house operated smoothly; if Joseph Choate or his guests wanted something, it
was there. They did not care how it came to be there; they only cared that it was there," L. BAKER, at
10, and he supports these statements by a citatibn to "Author's visit to Naumkeag [Choate's summer
home]." Id. at 510.
23. B. MURPHY, supra note 6."
24. Id. at 373 n.80.
The Yale Law Journal
sated him for his services as Brandeis's "paid political lobbyist and lieu-
tenant."' 25 This financial arrangement represented only one aspect of the
extrajudicial activities engaged in by Brandeis and Frankfurter, as re-
vealed by Murphy, that have caused a furor in the press and among
scholars of the Court. The larger questions-ethical, political and legal-
raised by these activities have been debated at length by several scholars
reviewing Murphy's book.26 Baker, however, contents himself with poking
a few holes in Murphy's factual argument.
27 His treatment of the issues
consists of two sentences: "That type of financial assistance was not un-
usual when professors' salaries were low, consultants' fees were nonexis-
tent, and foundation grants were sparse. Generally such aid was not dis-
cussed publicly; it was not considered a subject for discussion by
gentlemen and ladies." 28 These assertions by Baker are undocumented
and add little to the ongoing discussion of the propriety of Brandeis's and
Frankfurter's behavior.
Baker's discussion of the court-packing episode suffers from a similar
lack of supporting evidence. He states categorically that Frankfurter op-
posed Roosevelt's plan to alter the Supreme Court.
29 As proof of his con-
tention, Baker cites the comments of friends of Frankfurter who said he
disliked the Court plan even though publicly he would not take a stand
either for or against it.30 Other authors have come to different conclusions.
Alpheus Mason noted that he had it on the "best of authority that
[Frankfurter's] sympathies were then favorable to the plan."'" Bruce
Murphy observed that it is impossible to know for certain what Frank-
furter's views on the court-packing plan were: Existing evidence is con-
flicting, and Frankfurter's diary for 1937, which may have contained a
definitive statement of his position, was stolen from the Library of Con-
gress and thus cannot be consulted by scholars.
32 Another point Baker
makes, again in contrast to Murphy, is that after the conclusion of the
Court fight, Brandeis and Frankfurter resumed their old friendship. The
interruption of that relationship after the court-packing bill was an-
nounced, Baker states, "had not represented hostility but an awareness by
25. Id. at 10.
26. See, e.g., Dalton, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 1708 (1982); Danelski, Book Review, 96
HARV. L. REV. 312 (1982); Luban, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 1678 (1982); Nathanson, Book
Review, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 494 (1983); Resnik, Book Review, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 776 (1983).
27. For example, Murphy has dated the establishment of the Frankfurter fund in the Engineers
National Bank in late 1916, B. MURPHY, supra note 6, at 41, but Baker points out that there was no
Engineers National Bank in Boston before 1927. L. BAK:ER, at 243.
28. L. BAKER, at 243.
29. Id. at 327.
30. Id.
31. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 625.
32. B. MURPHY, supra note 6, at 180-82, 417 n.109, 418 n.111.
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both that friendship sometimes requires discretion."33 How Baker knows
this is a mystery, for he cites no sources to support his contention.34 In
sum, Baker's Brandeis and Frankfurther: A Dual Biography is so lack-
ing in authority that it has little to offer scholars.
Philippa Strum's Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People, on the
other hand, is a far more serious study and worthy of scholarly attention.
Although Alpheus Mason's Brandeis: A Free Man's Life will continue to
be consulted because of its encyclopedic range, Strum's book will be read
for the skillful portrait it paints of Brandeis, the whole man, public and
private, intellectual and practical. Far superior to its most recent bio-
graphical competitor, Lewis Paper's Brandeis,5 Strum's study attempts
to analyze the internal forces that motivated Brandeis's actions, as well as
to reveal the texture of the world in which he acted.36
If we look at Strum's treatment of one of the many interesting puzzles
that Brandeis's life presents-his sudden conversion to the cause of Zion-
ism-the value of Strum's work becomes evident. Approaching sixty years
of age, Brandeis apparently had spent little time or effort on the affairs of
his fellow Jews. He was religiously nonobservant, and, moreover, had
publicly lamented the division of citizens' political loyalties along ethnic
lines-the existence, as noted by Theodore Roosevelt, of "hyphenated
Americans." 8 Why then did Brandeis, in 1914, become a leader of the
American Zionist movement?
The germ of Strum's answer to this question can be found in Mason's
book,3" but it is only a bare outline compared to Strum's approach. From
the very beginning, Strum pays attention to the issues that will be crucial
in the determination of what factors influenced Brandeis's unexpected in-
volvement in Zionism. She rejects the idea-put forward by Allon Gal in
33. L. BAKER, at 336.
34. Murphy, on the other hand, maintains that the court-packing episode placed a "permanent
strain" on Brandeis and Frankfurter's friendship. B. MuRPHY, supra note 6, at 181. In his support-
ing citations Murphy indicates that other scholars do not wholly agree with him, but he bases his
view on a reading of the Brandeis-Frankfurter correspondence and personal interviews. See id. at 418,
n.112.
35. L. PAPER, supra note 6.
36. To my mind, one of the most serious drawbacks of Paper's biography is the absence of histori-
cal context. Brandeis forges ahead in a world about which we learn little. The literature of the Pro-
gressive Era, World War I, the 1920s, the Great Depression, and the New Deal is unfamiliar to
Paper, or perhaps he just ignores it. Paper's biography basically recounts familiar episodes in Bran-
deis's life, with some new details added, in a journalistic style that pails after the first few chapters.
There is very little analysis of Brandeis the man and the public figure as part of the society in which
he lived. As a result, we lack a knowledge of the complex and sometimes contradictory character of
the man.
37. For divergent views on just how much Brandeis was involved with Jews and Jewish affairs
before he turned to Zionism, compare A. MAsoN, supra note 2, at 441-51 with A. GAL, supra note
6, at 66-95.
38. A. GAL, supra note 6, at 93.
39. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 442-3.
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Brandeis of Boston 4"-that Brandeis's exclusion by Brahmin society in
Boston, during both his Harvard years and his career as a practicing at-
torney, threw him back to the fellowship of his co-religionists. Strum finds
no evidence that Boston's upper class did not accept Brandeis because he
was Jewish 41 and therefore dismisses this as a possible reason for Bran-
deis's turning to Zionism. Instead, she credits Brandeis's "knowledge of
classical Greece [and especially his admiration for Alfred Zimmern's
study, The Greek Commonwealth], his relationship with his uncle [Lewis
Naphtali] Dembitz, his mediation of the 1910 garment workers' strike, an
extraordinary meeting with an English Zionist [Jacob de Haas], and an-
other one with a Palestinian Jew [Aaron Aaronsohn]" with contributing
to his late conversion to Zionism. 42 Strum perceptively and absorbingly
describes the influence of each of these in Brandeis's transformation, but
she is at her best in demonstrating how Brandeis's wrestling with the
problems of industrial democracy led him to a vision of society that could
more easily be achieved in a Jewish state in Palestine than in the United
States. It was this vision, Strum convincingly argues, that prompted Bran-
deis's intense efforts to see such a community established.
In his 1892 lectures at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Brandeis, disturbed by accounts of the violent suppression of the Carnegie
steel workers' strike at Homestead, departed from his earlier belief in the
formal equality of labor and capital. Strum traces the subsequent evolu-
tion of his thoughts on the relationship between labor and industry from
traditional beginnings to the more progressive view that legislatures
should promote the interests of labor to offset the imbalance of power in
favor of industry that common-law courts had perpetuated; and, eventu-
ally, to the more radical conclusion that workers must share in the man-
agement of business. 43 Along the route of this intellectual odyssey Bran-
deis drew important lessons from his first-hand experiences, most notably
his mediation of the 1910 garment workers' strike. This conflict, in which
both employers and employees were Jews, convinced Brandeis that work-
ers could participate in industrial democracy and awakened in Brandeis a
sense of the bond between himself and other Jews."" From this point on,
his ideas on industrial management intertwined with his emotional trans-
formation as a Jew. Indeed, his espousal of workers' cooperatives, in
which the full human potential of each individual could be realized, took
40. See A. GAL, supra note 6, at ix, 76, passim.
41. P. STRuM, at 22 & n.16, 29-30 & n.33, 225-29.
42. Id. at 230.
43. See id. at 94-113, 159-95.
44. Id. at 180.
Vol. 95: 195, 1985
The Brandeis Spell
its inspiration in large part from the experience of the Jews on the kib-
butzim in Palestine."
5
Although Strum's interpretation of Brandeis's career before he became
a Supreme Court justice is insightful, her treatment of his accomplish-
ments on the bench suffers from a flaw that is shared by all the recent
works on Brandeis: the absence of any rigorous analysis of his economic
views as set forth in his judicial opinions. The obvious reason for this is
that Brandeis broke no new ground in these opinions. As Strum explains:
It is easy to hear echoes in these opinions of Brandeis's pre-Court
writings and testimony before congressional committees. His ideas
were forged by the combined experiences of home, Harvard, Boston,
his legal practice, and his days as the "People's Attorney," and they
did not change one iota once he reached the Court. A comprehensive
summary of Brandeis's 528 judicial opinions would be as repetitive
as it would be lengthy, because he kept hammering at the same
finely honed ideas he had espoused in the decades before he ascended
the bench. It is therefore unnecessary to delve at length here into
even all of those opinions that might be labeled "major." . . . The
history of his ideas moves with no break from his days as an attorney
to his years on the bench.""
But if Brandeis's ideas had not changed, surely the world to which he
applied them had. It is reasonable to ask whether those views, developed
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were wisely invoked
in the 1920s and '30s. Strum does not address this issue but, instead, of-
fers the problematic and unsubstantiated opinion that the economic ills of
the 1970s and 1980s would have been alleviated had Brandeis's policies
been followed.
47
One who does answer this question, however, and answers in the nega-
tive, is Thomas K. McCraw in a chapter of his Pulitzer Prize-winning
study, Prophets of Regulation."8 Using Brandeis's analysis of the trust
movement (which McCraw labels "very perceptive"' 9), McCraw shows,
in some detail, what he considers to be the fatal error in Brandeis's
thought. Brandeis correctly understood that the failure of many trusts
must be indicative of critical problems in that form of industrial organiza-
tion, and that if size were the crucial factor for success all trusts should
have prospered. But he missed the proper conclusion-"that large size
45. Id. at 189, 232-34.
46. Id. at 342-43.
47. See id. at 151-52, 168, 194-95, and 409-13.
48. T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF RE:GuLATION (1984). The other "prophets" examined by Mc-
Craw include Charles Francis Adams, Jr., James M. Landis, and Alfred E. Kahn.
49. Id. at 97.
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was an advantage to firms in some types of industries and a disadvantage
to firms in other types."'50 According to McCraw, "Brandeis too simply
asserted that bigness in general was inefficient."51 He demonstrated again
the "dominance of political over economic considerations in his think-
ing."" Brandeis's "fixation on bigness as the essence of the problem,"
McGraw observes, "doomed to superficiality both his diagnosis and his
prescription."53 And this preoccupation with the curse of bigness appeared
in enough of Brandeis's judicial opinions to make him appear naive to the
sophisticated economic analyst.
54
The lack of this kind of analysis in Strum's work, however, detracts
only slightly from its generally high quality. Based on years of research in
primary and secondary sources, this biography evidences throughout the
author's sympathetic understanding of her subject both as public figure
and private individual.
Having said that, however, we might inquire further just how much all
the recent Brandeis scholarship has added to our knowledge of the man.
Scholars have provided new details to flesh out the familiar episodes of his
life but have revealed little to change dramatically the picture we hold of
Brandeis. Until the publication of McCraw's Prophets of Regulation, the
legend appeared to have remained intact despite the muckraking efforts of
Bruce Murphy in The Brandeis /Frankfurter Connection.55 In fact, the
works published after Murphy's bombshell contain specific attempts to
refute his charges. 5'6 Even Murphy himself felt compelled to pay homage
to Brandeis; in his conclusion, Murphy predicted that after the material
presented in his study had been digested by scholars and the public, Bran-
deis would nevertheless remain a giant of twentieth-century America.'
The hagiographic view of Brandeis began during his lifetime with the
publication in 1936 of Alfred Lief's biography, Brandeis: The Personal
History of an American Ideal.58 Lief called Brandeis an "enduring exam-
ple" and cited other people's estimates of the Justice to bolster this judg-
ment: "I treasure the memory of my only visit to [Brandeis]: a person of
50. Id. at 99.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 109.
53. Id. at 141.
54. See id. at 338-39 n.117.
55. If we set aside Murphy's and Oxford University Press's deliberately sensational approach to
the subject matter of the book, see Cover, The Framing ofJustice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC 17
(May 5, 1982), we can appreciate the valuable information Murphy has to offer on Brandeis's fre-
quent involvement, while he was on the bench, in the work of political reform.
56. See L. BAKER, at 240-44; L. PAPER, supra note 6, at 256-58; P. STRuM, at 372-405.
57. B. MURPHY, supra note 6, at 341.
58. The term "hagiographic" is not metaphorical here. Cover, who calls Brandeis a "prophet,"
notes the well-known fact that FDR used to refer to Brandeis as "Isaiah." Cover, supra note 55, at
17.
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swift and clear insight, of keen conviction, wanting nothing but to serve
society, and serving in the loneliness of great work"-this from a personal
memorandum of Albert Einstein.59 In honor of Brandeis's upcoming sixti-
eth birthday, his fellow justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, had scrawled:
"You turn the third corner tomorrow. You have done big things with high
motives-have swept over great hedges and across wide ditches, always
with the same courage, the same keen eye, the same steady hand. As you
take the home stretch the onlookers begin to realize how you have ridden
and what you have achieved. I am glad that I am still here to say: Nobly
Done."60
What was it about Brandeis that inspired such respect and admiration,
that made Max Lerner's assessment of him as a "towering figure" seem
appropriate? Urofsky and Levy, the editors of the Brandeis Letters, focus
on his intelligence, his integrity, his energy, his tremendous strength of
character, and his own recognition of that strength that enabled him to
behave like the symbol he was thought to be. 1 From a reading of the
various biographies of Brandeis, a number of other factors that en-
couraged high regard became apparent. Most attractive was Brandeis's
moral vision of society and his attempt to live his life according to moral
principles. His biographers realized that he was not always success-
ful-witness the complaints about his behavior as an attorney that were
brought out during his confirmation hearings before the Senate 2-but
this hardly produced a nick in the solid wall of esteem. The breadth of
Brandeis's knowledge and interests astonished people. But perhaps more
than anything else, the image that emerges of Brandeis as a romantic fig-
ure spurning modernity (he hated cars and telephones) and engrossed in
the life of the mind continues to captivate. As Dean Acheson, a law clerk
to Justice Brandeis, concluded at Brandeis's death: "In a time of moral
and intellectual anarchy, he handed on the great tradition of faith in the
mind and spirit of man."
'6 3
Will this be the last word on Brandeis? Despite the plethora of recent
works, there is still room, as Thomas McCraw has shown, for a variety of
fruitful studies dealing with the quality of Brandeis's thought both as it
affected his actions in the world of politics and business, and as it shaped
the corpus of his judicial opinions. A reading of the bulk of the Brandeis
literature reveals a need for systematic analysis of Brandeis's judicial con-
tributions. Alexander M. Bickel began the work many years ago in his
59. A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 13 (1936).
60. Quoted in 5 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (1978), supra note 3, at xvi.
61. 1 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at xxx-xxxiii.
62. Although many of the charges by the opponents of Brandeis's confirmation were outrageous,
at least one of the complaints about his legal ethics was by no means frivolous. See L. PAPER, 221-26.
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brief but brilliant book, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis.6 More should and will be done. And then, perhaps, we shall have
all the information we need to assess, finally, the contributions of Louis
D. Brandeis.
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